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Strategies for government reform
Charles F. Bingman
Governance is the ultimate mechanism for 
directing the affairs of a nation, and it is, of ne-
cessity, the exercise of power because it is the 
primary official and approved instrument for 
the making national decisions. This remains 
true even where there is a strong and inde-
pendent private sector which controls most of 
the economic life of the country, because even 
then, the government has enormous influence 
over the environment in which the private sec-
tor functions. If a government is dictatorial 
and authoritarian, chances are that decision-
making is in the hands of a single individual 
or a small group of elite power holders. If a 
government is more democratic and represen-
tative, the power of the government must be 
focused by building a reasonable public con-
sensus for major decisions. In either case, sec-
ond and third level decisions are linked to the 
functioning of elaborate structures of govern-
ment agencies with power designated by laws 
enacted by legislative bodies that own and 
operate mechanisms for negotiation, compro-
mise, or decision by fiat.
The one absolute essential for curbing per-
verse political power is to generate and focus 
public attention on the activities of the politi-
cal leadership. The public will always be con-
cerned; the real question is whether such con-
cern can develop real leverage on the political 
leaders. This is not mission impossible; there 
are in fact many ways in which this leverage 
can be built. Even in absolute tyrannies, there 
are tides running which offer opportunities for 
reformist action. Old tyrants die, and regimes 
change. Legislatures and judges find windows 
of opportunity to change pathological laws or 
call culprits to account. Internal conflicts be-
tween elements of the elite may split the re-
gime and open up further opportunities. And 
even tyrannies can be overthrown, either by in-
ternal forces, or by external pressures. It helps 
to remember that, primarily by internal upris-
ings, gone are Duvalier and Marcos, apartheid 
in South Africa, Franco, Ceausescu, the Khmer 
Rouge, Charles Taylor and Edi Amin, Peron, 
Mao and many other seemingly invulnerable 
tyrants. And the world has acted to terminate 
the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Tojo, 
Hussein, and Milosovic.
Public pressure or the reform of bad laws 
may be almost hopeless in the short run in the 
face of absolute tyrannies, and the real hope 
must be placed in the longer term turns of fate. 
But the most valuable of such public “watch-
dog” activities can take the following forms:
Despite their frustrations, elections still are 
the one best hope, because they can be used to 
legitimize and focus opposition. A regime that 
is forced to steal an election is also revealing 
the bankruptcy of its national standing, and 
the narrowness of its elitist base. In the con-
temporary world, seriously corrupt elections 
may now precipitate world-wide attention and 
cause the monitoring of the next election by 
international evaluators, giving greater hope 
to the opposition.
In even the tamest of captive legislatures, 
there will be some members with the courage 
to oppose the creation of pathological laws. 
These people can be visibly supported by oth-
ers in society, and they can identify bad law 
proposals so that opposition can be mobilized 
against them. Citizen groups can help protect 
honest politicians and public officials by giv-
ing them positive visibility and making it more 
risky to attack them. Hopefully, fewer bad laws 
can be sneaked through in secret. Existing bad 
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laws stand a better chance of being mitigated 
or neutralized.
Just as police rely on informers for intelli-
gence, so too can politicians or public officials 
obtain information from citizens and private 
organizations about what governments are 
doing wrong. The worse the regime the great-
er is the need to make such “whistle blowers” 
safe, secure and anonymous. But what is re-
ally needed are people within the power struc-
ture who will listen and perhaps act, and can 
be trusted not to shoot the messengers. It may 
be an honest politician, an anti-corruption 
agency, a newspaper reporter, or a trustwor-
thy public official. 
The generation of greater public inter-
est in the machinations of their government 
is not easy and it may even be dangerous. 
Public interest relates to the wellbeing of the 
whole population, and should be clearly dis-
tinguished from the more self-serving special 
interest politics. But even a relatively small 
group of citizens or a small staffed organiza-
tion can lock on to an issue such as elemen-
tary/secondary education, child care, or the 
failures of state owned enterprises, or the evi-
dences of corruption. A variety of people have 
useful skills to contribute: research, writing, 
evidence gathering, intelligence generation, 
internet communications and so on. Often, 
the best sources of such intelligence are from 
employees of government agencies or state 
owned enterprises that cannot live with their 
own corrupt environment.
One of the targets for civic action must be 
the laws themselves, especially laws that pro-
tect the right to oppose the regime. First and 
foremost, this means the existence of a law 
that provides for honest elections. In addi-
tion, laws are needed that secure the right for 
people to meet and to protest, and to broaden 
as much as possible the range of subjects that 
can be debated without being considered as 
an attack on the State. Among these subjects 
should be the right to press for anti-corruption 
measures, the effective audit or evaluation of 
agency activities, and the rules under which 
corruption can be investigated, removed, or 
prosecuted. 
Obviously, any authoritarian regime can 
probably block any such efforts, and reform 
may not always be possible. Reform forces 
must be patient and persistent, and be ready to 
take any opportunity that comes along and to 
capitalize on regime weaknesses. The process 
of reform has to start at the top with the draft-
ing of national laws. There should be constant 
pressure to define in law if possible that which 
is not authorized, or is specifically forbidden, 
or is defined as illegal. Even policy statements 
that do not convey specific authority can still 
be used to commit to national goals and pre-
ferred actions. The point is that any means of 
preventing pathology from being locked into 
law is of enormous value. Any limitation of 
political excess of power is worth fighting for. 
Even if these laws are ignored or violated, they 
still serve as anchors which opponents of a re-
gime can use to justify attacks on tyrants.
Similarly, politicians love to draft broad no-
ble sounding legislative language which seems 
to promise a government solution to all ills. 
But reality often is that the broader and more 
open ended the legislative language, the more 
power it conveys, and the more vulnerable it 
is to pathological interpretation. There is usu-
ally too great a gap between legislative flights 
of fancy and the harsher world of implemen-
tation. Even in wealthy and stable countries, 
there is increasing disenchantment over leg-
islative promises not kept. In authoritarian 
states, wide open legislative mandates are of-
ten deliberately sought, since each represents 
a form of legislative abdication. It transfers all 
power to the executive and leaves the legisla-
ture with no basis for curbing that executive 
power. Once such wide authority is obtained 
by the executive, it is extremely difficult to take 
back, and legislative bodies, having conceded 
too much, become largely irrelevant.
It is therefore exceedingly important that 
legislative bodies must be pressed, by whatev-
er forces in the country can be brought to bear, 
to retain their ability to act as a counter force 
Strategies for government reform
7© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 1
to the usurpation of power by the executive. 
Legislatures need to protect their own author-
ity, first by having the courage to resist pres-
sures to corrupt the laws, and then through 
their own internal control of the law drafting 
process. In many cases, a two house legisla-
ture appears to be superior to a single house 
because it creates some checks and balances 
between the two, making it more difficult for 
executives to seize control. It is also valuable 
to create a separation between the drafting of 
laws and the approval of appropriations of the 
money to implement the law. As an adjunct of 
this reasoning, legislative bodies should re-
sist any authority of the government to gen-
erate revenue that is not officially controlled 
through the legislative oversight process. For 
example, in countries such as the old USSR, 
the Peoples Republic of China, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and elsewhere, the military budget is 
often outside of the regular budget and is vir-
tually uncontrolled. In addition, the military 
often controls production assets that generate 
revenue, which is used solely for the support 
of the military establishment. This has helped 
to generate unwarranted and excessive mili-
tary power, and has been a direct and powerful 
enabler of corruption.
Further, legislative bodies must guard the 
Constitution and important basic authorizing 
laws by making them harder to change, usually 
by requiring a 2/3 majority vote for change ap-
proval, or even requiring a Constitutional con-
vention to ratify change. The Constitution and 
supporting legislation should clearly authorize 
the conduct of political parties, and preferably 
they should lay down the rules for honest elec-
tions in some detail if possible. Even where a 
dictator is prepared to steal elections, Consti-
tutional definition of proper elections would 
highlight the nature of such pathology and 
provide a stronger basis for opposition.
Also if possible, Constitutions or basic laws 
should provide mechanisms to prevent the 
abuse of presidential appointment powers. 
Patronage is one of the most powerful tools 
of authoritarian regimes, and it conveys five 
great advantages. First, it is used to make 
sure that key jobs – particularly those which 
involve control of money or the allocation of 
valuable resources – are filled by regime loyal-
ists who will do as they are told. Second, politi-
cal allies and supporters can be rewarded for 
past services. In many cases, these payoff jobs 
are in lesser positions such as “commissions” 
or “boards” with little or nothing to do. Third, 
some appointments will be protective. For ex-
ample, if a law requires the appointment of 
an Inspector General in an agency, the threat 
of that office to the corrupt can be mitigated 
by the appointment of a loyalist or an incom-
petent to the post. Fourth, appointments can 
reach down blow the crucial top positions. 
Unless the number and location of authorized 
positions is strictly controlled, the agency can 
be filled with numerous, largely meaningless 
jobs such as “special assistants”, or “assistant 
deputies” or “deputy assistants”, all of which 
provide comfortable salaries without the dis-
comfort of doing any work.
One of the more political games played with 
the agency workforce is the hiring of large 
numbers of lower level employees in redun-
dant jobs. After the disintegration of the USSR, 
and the conversion of eastern European states, 
studies indicated that as many as 40% of low 
level jobs were redundant and existed primar-
ily so that politicians could say that in their so-
cialist economy “nobody is unemployed”.
It is also widely true in corrupt regimes that 
most political appointments will have little or 
nothing to do with skill or knowledge or com-
petence. The acid test is loyalty to the regime. 
But what is worse is that, when a regime is cor-
rupt, the power of appointment permits the 
extension of corruption down into the second 
and third levels of the organization. This net-
working is often has an elaborate structure of 
its own hidden within the more formal struc-
ture of the agency. At each level, the boss is ex-
pected to develop whatever corrupt practices 
are possible, with profits shared upward to the 
agency head. Such a perverse structure is self-
concealing and self-protecting, and becomes a 
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formidable obstacle to any effort for reform.
There are ways to counter the growth of 
such entrenched pathological structures, but 
all of them rest on the ability to find honest, 
courageous people to replace the crooks. 
Just as the laws must protect against the 
abuses of the appointment authorities of an 
agency, laws must provide protection for the 
conduct of the agency’s most important inter-
nal processes. 
Finally, the machinations of bad regimes 
can be leveraged from the outside. 
Globalization is not a phenomenon being 
experienced only in the corporate world. Gov-
ernment has also built up a globalized struc-
ture including the United Nations, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Trade Organization, and many regional 
bodies concerned with economics and human 
rights. As these international bodies become 
stronger and more experienced, they have 
moved to become forces against pathological 
governments. In addition, many forms of civic 
community have become globalized, includ-
ing environmentalism, unions, the health care 
professions, women’s rights, and many others. 
These institutions have developed their own 
doctrine; they assert that they represent ac-
ceptable standards of what is right and wrong 
in their chosen fields. The World Health Or-
ganization has extensive and comprehensive 
standards for all forms of health care that are 
held up for comparison against the practices 
in individual countries. Environmental orga-
nizations define what is right and wrong with 
respect to threats to air or water pollution, land 
use, conservation of natural resources, protec-
tion of wild life, and avoidance of chemical 
hazards. All such organizations now are capa-
ble of proceeding against what they consider 
violations of these standards in any country in 
the world, regardless of political boundaries, 
and despite traditional concepts of national 
sovereignty. 
Most developing countries are compelled 
by economic circumstances to resort to bor-
rowing from foreign sources, both public and 
private, and this gives these external lend-
ing institutions exceptional influence over 
the economic policies and practices of their 
debtor nations, whether they like it or not. The 
IMF may demand compliance with stringent 
conditions of government fiscal and mon-
etary reform as a condition for borrowing or 
extending loan terms, and increasingly, other 
non-financial organizations have urged and 
persuaded to make human rights concerns 
part of the “structural adjustment” require-
ments that lending institutions impose. Mat-
ters such as women’s rights, minority rights, 
voting reforms, and the adequacy of education 
or health care have been adopted by interna-
tional lenders. 
The same tides are running in the policies 
of countries even when they give money away. 
Most developed nations maintain some for-
eign assistance programs in the form of dona-
tions or grants of funds to troubled countries, 
and donors are increasingly resistant to the 
wastage of these funds by crooked or incom-
petent governments. Even private banks find 
that there is risk in lending to countries with 
poor human rights records. After many years 
of indifference, lending institutions now rec-
ognize that they must pay more serious atten-
tion to the record of corruption in borrowing 
countries, since neither voters nor stockhold-
ers appreciate the sense that lent money is 
being squandered or stolen. Over the last few 
years, all of these external forces have had a 
tendency to become more interrelated, and to 
concentrate their reform efforts on the more 
perverse of their client states. The support of 
these external organizations also lends cred-
ibility and backing to those people within a 
pathological state who are attempting to op-
pose its regime.
Robert I. Rotberg, in an article in Foreign 
Affairs Journal offers a bleak and shocking 
compendium of the nature of states that suffer 
massive failure: “Failed states are tense, con-
flicted, and dangerous. They generally share 
the following characteristics: a rise in criminal 
and political violence; a loss of control over 
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their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguis-
tic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of 
terror against their own citizens; weak institu-
tions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastruc-
ture; an inability to collect taxes without undue 
coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed 
health system; rising levels of infant mortal-
ity and declining life expectancy; the end of 
regular schooling opportunities; declining 
levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; 
a widespread preference for non-national cur-
rencies; and basic food shortages, leading to 
starvation. Failed states ultimately face rising 
attacks on their fundamental legitimacy.” (2)
The aftermath of a catastrophically col-
lapsed state is often a surprisingly fertile time 
for significant national change for the better. 
During the height of a powerful authoritarian 
regime, there is almost no effective leverage 
that the opponents of the regime can exercise. 
The grip of the state apparatus is simply too 
strong. But if somehow a regime can be over-
thrown, the very emotions that allowed the 
overthrow to succeed can be used to drive the 
emotion of reform. The collapse of the Soviet 
authoritarians, the wave of reform in China, 
the freedom of black South Africa, the depos-
ing of the Khmer Rouge, the independence of 
S. Sudan, or the success of the initial Cuban 
revolution are victories that encourage oth-
ers to believe that their own dilemmas can 
be dealt with. When new governments are 
brought to power, it is seldom clear what they 
will do or how they will do it. It is vital that the 
gap between the failure of the old regime, and 
the period of hardening of the new situation 
be as productive as possible. One of the first 
prerequisites is to mount as effective an emer-
gency resuscitation program as possible, and 
it is here that international organizations are 
at their best. Emergency aid and funds from 
foreign donors can largely fill a gap that the 
weak new government cannot fill themselves. 
All of the basics of human existence -- food, 
shelter, clothing, medicines, education and 
physical protection are the top priorities even 
to the exclusion of all else.
The second priority is certainly the restora-
tion of vital public services, and it makes little 
difference whether services like a clean water 
supply, removal of sewage and trash and their 
related health threats, the restoration of elec-
trical power and the creation of some form 
of transportation system are provided by the 
government or by private organizations. Some 
of these services can be expensive to restore 
and it is critical to get started as soon as pos-
sible, as the painful delays in post-war Iraq 
well illustrate, as does the lag of governments 
in the United States to the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster. In other cases such as the removal 
of trash or debris, the costs are low and many 
people are willing to volunteer. Most forms of 
public regulation must undoubtedly be for-
gotten in the short run, and if possible much 
streamlined for the long run. For example, 
where formerly it might have taken months 
of bureaucratic clearances (and perhaps a few 
bribes) to initiate a small business, the gov-
ernment should simply jettison this baggage 
and turn all small entrepreneurs loose. In 
fact, the “bottom up” vitality of people starting 
small enterprises from retailing and customer 
services to day care centers is the single best 
hope for rapid economic recovery. The wide-
spread destruction of housing can best be met 
by temporary shelter not in remote refugee 
camps but in the old neighborhood communi-
ties. The combination of a few shops and some 
temporary shelter means a return to at least a 
rudimentary level of communal stability. The 
government could do a lot worse than to be-
come the supplier of building materials and 
a central clearing house for the skills needed 
in both residential and commercial recon-
struction. Cheap small loans with long matu-
rity dates are valuable, along with open ended 
grants of funds to local governments for all 
forms or revitalization.
These are the places where governments 
and donor organizations should be commit-
ting scarce funds initially. To the extent that 
additional funds are available, they should be 
concentrated on short term economic devel-
Strategies for government reform
10 © Business and Public Administration Studies, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 1
opment priorities. The criteria for priority set-
ting should not be political but based on the 
greatest public need. There should never be a 
return to the distorted allocations of the power 
base that got a country into the catastrophic 
dilemma in the first place, and the collapse of 
the old regime may represent the best oppor-
tunity in decades for reallocation of power and 
greater equity in its deployment. One of the 
most challenging of these changes will prob-
ably be to recast the military away from the 
oppressors of the population to its guardians. 
A great fear in a weakened state is that power 
will be seized by a small band of armed pow-
er seekers who will simply start the horrible 
cycle all over again. Only the military, under 
effective partnership with a reform regime has 
the power to prevent this, and there must be 
a collateral strengthening of law enforcement 
capacities for the suppression of street crime 
and protection of citizens and institutions.
One of the objectives of this sequence of re-
covery is to prepare the way for the return of 
the displaced population, who may have fled to 
safer parts of the country if any, or to refuges 
in neighboring countries. These refugees may 
have lost everything but they cannot remain 
for long as unwanted guests in other countries 
or as permanent wards of a bankrupt home-
land. Often, the last remaining resource left to 
these people is the most important – their en-
ergy and their skills. It is especially important 
that key skills for recovery be induced to re-
turn home. This includes doctors and nurses, 
teachers, managers, business people, and the 
providers of vital public services such as police 
and fire protection and public welfare. These 
people have options about where they exercise 
their talents and they may not want to return 
unless they can be shown a pattern of recovery 
that assures reasonable stability and opportu-
nity. 
One of the most dangerous threats to re-
covery is the prospect of rapid inflation driven 
by the scarcity of goods which in turn further 
drives down the current value of the currency. 
One of the solutions to this dilemma may sim-
ply be to let the informal economy function 
openly to facilitate the movement of goods 
and services until the more formal economy 
can reestablish its capabilities. Such a process 
should be used to facilitate the restoration of 
farming as fast as possible and letting farm-
ers sell their produce at the best price possi-
ble. This option is likely to be more productive 
than initiation of (or return to) political price 
controls that subsidize some elements of the 
economy and punish others. Similarly a tem-
porary labor market can be created by using 
external donor funds to undertake rebuilding 
of vital public infrastructure, which creates at 
least temporary jobs in construction, distribu-
tion and transport. This would be better than 
some protracted form of public dole.
The longer term ambition for a collapsed 
state is that it will be able to rebuild a substan-
tial portion of the economy as it was prior to 
the collapse, and then to use this base as the 
means to mount a new program of economic 
development and expansion. Without eco-
nomic revitalization, it is difficult to see where 
the revenues will come from to support a re-
vitalization of public social programs and the 
repair of critical public infrastructure. Many 
of the less developed countries that have ex-
perienced collapse or significant deteriora-
tion were socialist states with a high degree of 
centrist control and dependence on economic 
policies such as price controls, import substi-
tution and inefficient state owned enterprises 
that can no longer be subsidized by the weak-
ened and bankrupt state. Such governments 
will face the sobering necessity of abandon-
ing many strongly held doctrines and policy 
conceptions about the role of the State. This 
is precisely the course of action now being 
followed by the People’s Republic of China 
which has abandoned almost all of the failed 
doctrines of the communist economic state. 
The new leadership must become quick stud-
ies in moving toward a far more market based 
and open for two main reasons. First, such 
an open ended environment may be critical 
in encouraging a “bottom up” entrepreneur-
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ship by individuals that the government could 
never achieve. Second, if there is any hope of 
inducing new capital investment from either 
domestic or foreign sources, investors must be 
given as much latitude as possible to create vi-
able businesses without government interfer-
ence. Both import and export controls must be 
eliminated, and the government must be seen 
as highly encouraging of all forms of trade. 
Such openness may downplay in the short run 
the need for normal government regulation of 
such concerns as public health and safety or 
protection of the environment but these forms 
of oversight can be reinstituted over time. 
Taxation will always be a problem since it is 
stoutly resisted even in wealthy countries but 
businesses can be expected to accept a simple, 
stable tax system with taxes set at reasonable 
levels. 
Of equal importance is the need for the re-
constituted government to come down harsh-
ly on all forms of corruption. Many of the old 
corrupt officials will remain in place since 
there is probably no one to replace them, but 
they must be made to understand that a re-
turn to the “good old days” will not be toler-
ated. The best hope for the government lies in 
honest leadership from the top down, and the 
creation of small hard-hitting anti-corruption 
units with real power to investigate and indict. 
There should also be the recognition that 99% 
of the population wants fairness and equity 
and want to be honest if possible but it is es-
sential that the pathology of government cor-
ruption is essentially eliminated.
It is possible also to be hopeful that people 
are better at reconciliation than governments. 
Too many governments made the fatal mistake 
of deliberately using the ethnic or regional di-
versity of the population to foment conflict for 
perverse political gain. People can be induced 
by their government to hate each other as the 
horrible examples in the Sudan, Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, Israel and a dozen other countries 
demonstrate. But if such hatred is unleashed 
it has proved to be uncontrollable and ulti-
mately has contributed to the destruction of 
the governments that unleashed it. It is often 
forgotten that such diverse populations were 
able to live together in relative peace before 
the government generated its hate policies. 
If a renovated government reverses such per-
versities and begins to promote reconciliation 
it is likely that the people will respond. South 
Africa is leading the way in such reconciliation 
promotion in the form of its Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission which is a model both in 
intent and in procedure that any government 
can emulate. 
Government failure and collapse is always 
catastrophic and destructive, but it may also 
be a time of great opportunity to get rid of ty-
rannical leadership, remodel government in-
stitutions away from control to facilitation, at-
tack the entrenched apparatus of corruption, 
and begin the process of restructuring of the 
economy. Recovering failed governments will 
find that there is a lot of support for a reform 
program of this kind from foreign govern-
ments and from international organizations 
and NGOs. 
Reform of Macroeconomic Policies
The government must be able to maintain a 
monetary policy that concentrates on control 
of inflation and the stability of the economy. 
Both the government and the private sector 
must be able to find money to borrow at rea-
sonable rates. The value of the national cur-
rency must be maintained and not allowed 
to fluctuate excessively, and it must trade at 
a reasonable rate in the international money 
market. But all too often, the real economic 
policy in a pathological state is something very 
different. Pathological leaders use whatever 
wealth the economy produces to buy power 
and pay each other off. Such governments 
become a vast corrupt structure, led by their 
leaders, universal in its application. The “big 
men” steal big; the little men steal small and 
all are fellows in a conspiracy of concealment. 
The public is lied to, or bought off by populist 
subsidies. The annual budget of governments 
are highly vulnerable to the sins of overspend-
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ing, but the political leadership seldom allows 
expenses such as salary increases or funds 
for maintenance and repair unless they have 
political value. But responsible fiscal policy 
should be dealing with the legitimate demands 
for capital expenditures for public infrastruc-
ture, funding for a reasonable “social safety 
net” and the normal day-to-day operations of 
the rest of the government.
 Many countries also suffer from the in-
adequacies of the tax system. In some cases, 
taxes are too narrow and inequitable so that 
some potential payers are allowed to escape. 
Whole segments of the economy such as the 
informal economy, or state owned enterprises 
may dodge taxation entirely. If tax collection 
and enforcement is weak, chances are that it 
is the allies of the regime who are let off the 
hook. Centrist governments may insist on cen-
tral collection of most taxes, which deprives re-
gional governments and cities of the ability to 
take advantage of other tax sources that might 
be more productive. Those governments that 
are notoriously inequitable and corrupt inevi-
tably create public resistance to taxation and 
outrage to corrupt tax evasion.
Reform of Trade Policies
Usually there is a great deal of concern 
about the balance of trade in a given country. 
Separate but related policies are needed which 
set the environment for both national exports 
and national imports. A deficit of trade (i.e. 
more imports than exports) is usually seen 
as bad because it drains money out of the do-
mestic economy. In order to improve the bal-
ance of trade, many countries try to restruc-
ture their economy to promote industries that 
can export. However, export becomes feasible 
not because of government policy but because 
there are many companies that can in fact be 
competitive in trade markets by offering goods 
at prices that compete favorably with what is 
available in other countries. 
But the whole pattern of ISI or import sub-
stitution strategies, if maintained for too long, 
leads to what is now perceived to be the sub-
optimal investment of scarce public funds. 
Government ISI policies generally have been 
interventionist on a broad front. Every ISI 
country has used an elaborate rationale for 
public intervention, masking the essential fail-
ures, and fooling the public into thinking the 
government knows what it is doing.
The urge to protect and subsidize ISI public 
enterprises has led to a cascade of related mul-
tiyear planning, heavy regulation of all eco-
nomic activity, used as weapons of economic 
control, administered prices, control or modu-
lation of normal market forces, subsidization, 
cross subsidization, partial or even total con-
trol of banking/lending, heavy government 
oversight of enterprise performance, and the 
“politics” of state control. It is now increasing-
ly apparent that the track record is one of dis-
appointment in validity of the ISI concept and 
in the performance of SOEs: chronic losses, 
inability to avoid import reliance, the high cost 
of sheltering both industries and labor, and a 
growing realization of the foolish failure to 
capitalize on export development potentials. 
But in many cases, these countries have been 
frozen by oppressive political protectiveness 
into their policies despite the wide recognition 
of clear failures or lost opportunities. Said an-
other way, the risks of government misman-
agement are greatest when the forces of the 
government are perverted and not balanced 
by real leverage in the hands of the public in 
their roles as consumers, and also by a private 
sector that is strong enough to protect its own 
interests and provide competition to keep the 
public sector “honest.” Yet these are exactly 
the kinds of outcomes that many regimes say 
they want to achieve. 
The centrist use of state enterprises re-
quires heavy commitments to enforcement of 
the government’s policies. This cost of enforce-
ment is both monetary and fiscal, and societal, 
and if the policies are wrong, then enforce-
ment is also wrong. There is a lot of evidence 
that these elites have been too short- sighted, 
inflexible, self serving, and inclined to let the 
“politics” of the economy override economic 
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reality. Time and again, great internalized 
power without effective check or balance has 
proved to be an overwhelming inducement to 
corruption and incompetence.
In recent years, some of the most dedicated 
“ISI” countries such as India, China, and Rus-
sia have been forced to abandon these fail-
ures. As nations back off from state controlled 
economies toward more market based econo-
mies, the role of the government has also fi-
nally tended to shift toward a policy of using 
the government to promote exportation. Limi-
tations on exports have virtually disappeared 
and limitations on imports have been elimi-
nated or modified to be more encouraging. 
Governments have realized that, in order to 
expand their domestic economies, imports of 
needed technology and the highest quality of 
goods at the lowest price is the key to domestic 
industrial development. Government money 
that used to be wasted in propping up inef-
ficient local producers is now more available 
for domestic social services. More countries 
now help their companies to sell overseas by 
using their foreign embassies or by setting up 
special trade offices in countries with high po-
tential for sales. Trade policy is now aimed at 
upgrading the mix, quality and value of manu-
factured goods so that they are more attractive 
or more profitable.
In every country, there is an urgent need for 
attraction of money to finance capital invest-
ment, especially in capital intensive manufac-
turing. Few developing countries are capable 
of generating this development money inter-
nally through the savings of their citizens, cor-
porations, or state enterprises. Most develop-
ing countries must redesign industrial policies 
that will attract foreign investors, or that will 
justify loans from international lending or-
ganizations. Thus, when a regime is corrupt, 
oppressive and untrustworthy it scares off the 
very investment that could save its economy. 
Some regimes don’t get it. Others don’t care as 
long as there is plenty left to loot.
Reform of Financial Policies
Structural adjustment almost always de-
mands the existence of a strong central bank 
that is committed to the stability of the cur-
rency, the availability of adequate lending 
resources, the liquidity of money, and the 
safety/security of banks throughout the coun-
try. Banking regulation is a growing part of 
structural adjustment programs. This means 
that sound, honest banking practices must be 
insured by bank oversight and auditing; stan-
dards defining lending limits and the main-
tenance of adequate reserves against loans; 
standards devising lending criteria to prevent 
loan default; insurance to protect depositors, 
borrowers and investors against bank failure.
The existence of a viable stock exchange 
is also crucial since it broadens the means 
by which small investors can participate and 
gives businesses a more powerful way to ac-
cumulate investment money. Stock markets 
also represent a way to “evaluate” companies 
since it represents a collective judgment as to 
the best places to invest.
Laws are required that provide for limit-
ing the liabilities of investors to actual invest-
ments and not to total personal resources, and 
protection of investors from false or mislead-
ing reports about the strength of individual 
companies. In more sophisticated economies, 
regulations must be extended to non-bank 
lending through institutions such as savings 
and loan institutions, insurance companies, 
special lending companies. 
Governments are also being pushed to 
clean up their policy act. This must certainly 
start with repudiation of past anti-private sec-
tor biases and adoption of a new willingness to 
take initiatives to help the private sector rath-
er than hinder it and letting the opportunities 
be defined by the market rather than stubborn 
retention of centrist policy control. This is in 
fact one of the crucial shifts taking place all 
over the world in both Less Developed Coun-
tries (LDC) and socialist states. The final step 
must then be the elimination of a whole range 
of government policies designed to control the 
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economy in general and in specific elements 
of the economy such as energy, banking, com-
munications and transport. At the same time, 
structures of price controls must be eliminat-
ed along with regulatory barriers, especially 
against things critical to local industry devel-
opment, especially raw materials, manufac-
turing equipment. 
As governments are able to reallocate and 
redirect public funds away from economic de-
velopment, which would be left increasingly to 
the private sector, they can concentrate their 
funds and attention toward meeting the huge 
backlog of needs for social services and public 
infrastructure. If there are the political guts to 
do so, this may result in reexamining margin-
al public programs (outside of the real social 
safety net) with the intent of elimination or se-
rious cutback of the less useful programs and 
those which are obsolete, ineffective or exces-
sively expensive. Often, this means the need to 
trim bloated public employee numbers and to 
retrench inflated wages or benefits. Fixed costs 
such as building operations or maintenance 
and repair that have long been neglected may 
require a lot of new and urgent attention. And 
finally, politicians must face up to reform of 
their national tax systems to eliminate favor-
itism, raise tax levels, or find new sources of 
revenue that can be exploited. Interestingly, 
governments that lack themselves the courage 
to seek higher taxes can “hide behind” the de-
mands of external lenders. This trap has been 
especially serious in socialist countries where 
governments have spent decades and count-
less amounts of money propping up failed 
state owned enterprises forcing banks to close 
out their bad debts with dependent corpora-
tions and making them face up to economic 
reality. 
Governments all over the world, when 
faced with the disasters following greedy lend-
ing make the initial (political) decision to bail 
out economically inefficient enterprises. If 
they do so in some major way, they have made 
two mistakes: poor reallocation of lending 
funds; and poor diversion of fiscal resources. 
Private borrowers have a vested interest in 
cheap credit and inflation -- which helps them 
pay off loans in cheapened money. For gov-
ernments, cheap credit may be inflationary, 
which the government is expected to prevent; 
and it forces tax increases which either raises 
the cost of public programs or reduces their 
impact. Rather than subsidize companies, 
governments should promote enlargement of, 
and competition among lending institutions. 
A popular new development is the formation 
of special development banks, for such con-
cerns as agricultural lending, urban develop-
ment, regional infrastructure development, or 
small business assistance. Development banks 
are a good idea, but whether they succeed is 
contingent on the nature of government in the 
first place. That is, if governments create im-
proper subsidies, then development banks will 
simply be a more targeted way to subsidize. If 
governments are corrupt, so too will be their 
development banks. If governments are hon-
est and stay out of reallocation games, devel-
opment banks can be useful. 
But even if the government stays neutral, 
many such banks are effectively captured by 
their clientele. State owned “policy” banks 
can become very politically skewed and sim-
ply divert funds from private markets. Many 
government restructuring efforts are in real-
ity bailouts of irresponsible banks and other 
lending institutions. In many cases, govern-
ments, through ownership of SOEs or pres-
sure on private banks, force them to make 
very bad loans in the name of bad politics. In 
many cases, banks then persuade the govern-
ment to absorb their bad loans or to permit 
them to be converted into equity or long term 
loans, which simply enriches the bad banks. 
Where short term loans are converted into 
long term loans this simply ties up money in 
the bad loans for a longer period of time. In 
addition, in the effort to create competition, 
governments often allow lending by such in-
stitutions as insurance companies, non bank 
financial intermediaries with lower levels of 
oversight. In the end, direct and selective in-
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tervention by the government in the alloca-
tion of financial resources tended to generate 
more difficult problems for both big business 
and the banks. The whole arena of “strategic 
industry” building also skewed the allocation 
of lending -- to defense industries for example, 
or to “commanding heights” industries con-
trolled and subsidized by governments. Policy 
loans severely constrained the independence 
and freedom of action of central banks. Their 
inability to adjust the pace of money flow then 
weakened their ability to impact inflation. In 
many places, the concentration of financial re-
sources on big companies meant the choking 
off of funds available for smaller companies 
or for the private sector in favor of the public 
sector. This hurt the economy in the long run. 
Also, the greed of these large companies egged 
on and protected by the government leads 
to overextension and contributes to massive 
failures during recessions. The perversion of 
banking systems has been one of the major 
tools of oppressive and corrupt regimes.
Curbing Management Corruption
Given the will, there are many ways in 
which management corruption can be pre-
vented or mitigated. Some involve broad gov-
ernment-wide management policies which can 
be mandated in law or implemented through 
individual agency adoption. Perhaps the most 
important is the use of maximum feasible 
competition in all government activities that 
allocate resources – systems such as awards 
of contracts, grants, loans, or the use of public 
lands or facilities. This may also include care-
ful control of licenses for valuable assets such 
as broadcasting wavelengths or the allocation 
of access to airport gates. 
It is also vitally important to require inter-
nal transparency of agency operations. The 
processes by which agencies carry out their 
programs should be clearly defined, made as 
simple and understandable as possible, and 
widely published for all employees who can 
then know what is acceptable and what is not. 
This transparency must also extend to the out-
side through published summaries of agency 
authority and operating procedures. This can 
and should be accompanied by some form of 
public review and comment before important 
divisions are made, or key processes changed. 
Special emphasis, often neglected, should be 
placed on making visible which officials make 
key decisions and why. 
No public official, including political lead-
ership should be authorized to have what are 
generally known as “slush funds”; that is, 
funds that are available without controls or 
justifications or audits. Somewhat more prob-
lematically, it may be vital to develop some 
forms of protection for career officials from 
the unwarranted intervention of political lead-
ership into decisions that should rest on merit 
or competition. Obviously, political leadership 
is necessary but what should be restricted is 
the tendency of politicians to meddle in man-
agement decisions such as contract awards. It 
is axiomatic: bad politics makes bad manage-
ment.
In addition to these broad policies, there 
are many measures to increase the likelihood 
of detection and prevention of corrupt prac-
tices. Inspectors General or some equivalent 
should be legislatively mandated in every pub-
lic agency, with strong independent powers 
of investigation and discovery. Either inde-
pendently or as a part of an Office of Inspec-
tor General, a skilled corps of auditors should 
be authorized to insist on the examination of 
all agency records and actions. Every program 
manager should be charged with the respon-
sibility of assuring that each program is free 
of corruption or mismanagement even before 
the auditors arrive. 
There is an old axiom for auditors and in-
spectors: “follow the money”. Special atten-
tion should be given to the creation and en-
forcement of close controls over financial flows 
from initial collection of revenue by the gov-
ernment to the authorization by legislatures of 
funds for expenditure by the agencies. Within 
each agency, authority should be limited as to 
the numbers of officials who can authorize the 
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commitment of expenditures – the fewer the 
better. A second internal control should be 
maintained through the use of separate offi-
cials who can approve the actual disbursement 
of funds. Then, there should be management 
reviews and post-audits of whether the funds 
were actually used properly and for the pur-
poses for which they were authorized.
Experience shows that perhaps the best 
“auditors” of agency actions are not necessar-
ily official auditors, but the general public and 
sometimes employees of an agency who have 
inside knowledge of what is happening. Good 
confidential methods should be available for 
the public to lodge complaints or report cor-
ruption. The best intelligence about govern-
ment corruption often comes from its victims. 
Those agencies that operate hotlines are of-
ten amazed and gratified by the numbers and 
sharpness of public responses. Internal agen-
cy whistleblowers may also be remarkably 
valuable but this often is punished by agency 
officials who have something to conceal, even 
if it is only their own mismanagement. Whis-
tle blowing is a term coined to highlight the 
fact that agency employees who witness cor-
rupt practices are motivated to try and stop 
them. The key problem is for the employee or 
a member of the public to have a safe place to 
go with this kind of knowledge, and the sense 
that there will be some institutional response 
to justify the risk.
In a corrupt or pathological organization, 
employees may become victims. They must be 
protected in some way from the arbitrary and 
capricious acts on the part of agency leader-
ship, including unwarranted firings, transfers, 
or demotions. Most employees probably want 
to be honest, but they can’t be if they are sub-
ject to threats, coercion and intimidation, or if 
they are ordered to carry out what are clearly 
illegal or improper orders. Often, it is actually 
bureaucracy that protects them. If policies and 
authorized procedures within an agency are 
clearly defined in some detail, the employee 
then has a basis for resisting or fending off an 
order is improper or illegal.
Finally, in truly scandalous governments, 
corruption is not just ignored, it is organized 
and encouraged. Even where the apparatus 
for controlling corruption exists, it may be ig-
nored or circumvented. What the public de-
serves and wants to see is that the corruptors 
are caught and removed, and that corrupt acts 
receive serious punishment. For situations of 
entrenched corruption in agencies, it may be 
impossible for the organization to purge itself 
from the inside and the only alternative may be 
the creation of external anti-corruption cam-
paigns mounted and enforced from outside 
of the agency. Thus, it is vital that there exist 
a forceful government-wide posture against 
corruption and a set of instruments by which 
this posture can be carried out. Most countries 
have various forms of oversight agencies: In-
spectors General, government-wide auditing 
and evaluation agencies, a government-wide 
budget review organization, and often, a con-
tract review and oversight board. There is a 
growing tendency too to create a special anti-
corruption agency with strong independent 
powers.
But of critical importance is the participa-
tion of the national legislative body. It was ar-
gued earlier that the rule of law can become 
perverse if the laws themselves are patholog-
ical and this is a sin laid at the door of par-
liaments and congresses. The fact that such 
legislative bodies can be dominated and per-
verted by tyrants does not relieve them of the 
ultimate responsibility of maintaining the in-
tegrity of the base of national laws and fiscal 
appropriations. Part of this responsibility in-
volves the oversight of the executive agencies 
of the government, and these agencies can be 
aided and abetted in preventing corruption if 
the laws themselves make it clear exactly what 
practices are defined as illegal or improper. 
Further, anti-corruption controls can be de-
liberately incorporated into laws and mandat-
ed in more detailed government regulations. 
Legislatures can and should maintain their 
own forms of transparency and openness to 
public comment, review, complaint and edu-
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cation. Legislation can even be created that 
mitigates the worst forms of political patron-
age, both within the civil service and among 
top political appointments. It is even possible, 
if not likely, that the opportunities for corrup-
tion may be substantially reduced by the elim-
ination of useless or wasteful public programs 
and activities. Every public official at senior 
levels should be required to disclose the state 
of their personal finances; however, a mistake 
often made is not to extend this requirement 
to politicians.
In an extreme environment of embedded 
and institutionalized corruption, some gov-
ernments have turned to a promising new 
approach – popularly called a “watch dog 
agency”. These agencies are not designed for 
routine auditing or inspection but have the 
single purpose of mounting government-wide 
anti- corruption attacks. The record of watch 
dog agencies is mixed, with some such as that 
in Singapore cited as highly effective while oth-
ers are all but useless. In assessing the track 
record of these agencies, certain characteris-
tics have emerged as critical to their success: 
1. Such agencies may be established at the 
government-wide level or placed in individu-
al agencies of government but in either case, 
they must be independent and must report to 
the highest possible level. Most are created by 
special legislation that establishes the needed 
independence. Many such laws provide that 
the reports of the watch dog organization must 
be submitted either to an agency head or to 
the legislature. The staffs should be politically 
neutral and not beholden to any organization 
or persons other than those who appoint them.
2. The agency should be deliberately 
weighted to provide the maximum capacity 
to do operational field investigation – on-the-
ground rooting out of corruption. 
3. The authority of the agency should be 
powerful. It must be given the authority to 
investigate any situation, have open access 
to all government records, including the legal 
authority to subpoena such records. It should 
also have the right to interrogate any individ-
ual or to investigate the private records of per-
sons where corruption is suspected. 
4. Authority should extend beyond the gov-
ernment itself into the institutions that are en-
gaged in government financed activities such 
as state owned enterprises, contractors, grant-
ees, local governments to which government 
authorities have been delegated, or to those 
holding government licenses or charters.
5. In addition to the power to investigate, 
many watch dog agencies have also been 
granted “intelligence gathering” authority 
which opens up such tools as wire taps, sur-
veillance, and clandestine ways to penetrate 
suspect groups or organizations.
6. There should also be the means by which 
secret access is provided to whistleblowers or 
the general public who want to report sus-
pected corrupt practices without fear of ret-
ribution. This access should include reports 
against politicians, since one of the greatest 
inhibitors of ant-corruption criticism is the 
fear of political retaliation.
7. The independent capability to prepare 
cases for prosecution is vital, since one of the 
“choke points” that a regime can most effec-
tively control is that of the actions of public 
prosecutors who are public employees, subject 
to direction from their political superiors.
 But the creation of one or more anti-
corruption agencies is no guarantee of an ef-
fective attack on the problem. For example, 
most countries in Southeast Asia have such 
agencies, but few function effectively, mostly 
because of lack of political support, or ad-
equate response by agency management. In 
the Philippines, seven anti-graft laws enacted 
over a period of several years has yielded only 
spastic results because of lack of enforcement. 
Public prosecutors are notably reluctant to de-
velop cases. Even those cases that are brought 
before a court may languish for months or 
years. The usual approach to muzzling these 
agencies lies in appointment powers of the 
president who may appoint either incompe-
tents or loyalists to the regime whose primary 
role is to blunt any embarrassing initiatives.
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